No Pain—No Gain—Should Personal Injury Damages Keep Their Tax Exempt Status by Chapman, Douglas K.
University of Arkansas at Little Rock Law Review 
Volume 9 Issue 3 Article 1 
1986 
No Pain—No Gain—Should Personal Injury Damages Keep Their 
Tax Exempt Status 
Douglas K. Chapman 
Follow this and additional works at: https://lawrepository.ualr.edu/lawreview 
 Part of the Tax Law Commons, and the Torts Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Douglas K. Chapman, No Pain—No Gain—Should Personal Injury Damages Keep Their Tax Exempt Status, 
9 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 407 (1987). 
Available at: https://lawrepository.ualr.edu/lawreview/vol9/iss3/1 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Bowen Law Repository: Scholarship & Archives. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in University of Arkansas at Little Rock Law Review by an authorized editor of Bowen 
Law Repository: Scholarship & Archives. For more information, please contact mmserfass@ualr.edu. 
UNIVERSITY OF ARKANSAS AT LITTLE ROCK
LAW JOURNAL
VOLUME 9 1986-87 NUMBER 3
NO PAIN - NO GAIN? SHOULD PERSONAL INJURY
DAMAGES KEEP THEIR TAX EXEMPT STATUS?
Douglas K. Chapman*
Taxation has been called "a major instrument of social and eco-
nomic policy."1 Besides its obvious goal of raising revenue, taxation at-
tempts to shift resources from the private sector to the public sector, to
promote "vertical"' equity by distributing the cost of government fairly
by income classes, to promote "horizontal" '3 equity by taxing equally
those in approximately the same economic circumstances, and to facili-
tate economic growth, stability, and efficiency.' While the effectiveness
of the methods created and implemented to attain these goals is often a
matter for dispute, tax policy in general is regarded as a legitimate tool
for promoting economic growth and stability.3 This article will go be-
yond the general discussion of the goals of taxation and explore the
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Toledo College of Law. A.B., 1971, The Ohio
State University; J.D., 1974, Ohio Northern University College of Law. The author wishes to
express his thanks for the research assistance of Marcia A. Wagner and the preparation assistance
of Lin Whalen.
I. J. PECHMAN, FEDERAL TAX POLICY 5 (1983).
2. The principle of vertical equity as applied to income taxation relies on the idea that per-
sons who have a greater ability to support the requirement of government should pay a greater
proportionate share of their incomes for that support. Id.
3. The principle of horizontal equity as applied to a system of income taxation relies on the
notion of justice that similarly situated people should be treated equally and that people with
equal incomes should pay equal taxes. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 6.
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effect that tax policy has had on the decision not to tax certain items.
In particular, the focus of attention will be on section 104(a)(2) of the
Internal Revenue Code6 which excludes from gross income the amount
of any damages received on account of personal injury or sickness.
Over the almost seventy-year history of section 104(a)(2) and its
predecessors, the courts, commentators, and the Internal Revenue Ser-
vice (Service) have disputed both the scope of the section, the intent of
the original exemption, and whether any such intent is being frustrated
or perpetuated. The Tax Reform Act of 19861 has been called a revolu-
tion in tax reform.8 In this Act, Congress dramatically lowered individ-
ual income tax rates,9 but to keep the Act revenue neutral, Congress
drastically broadened the tax base.10 In so doing Congress has included
many items in gross income that heretofore have been exempted. 1
One item that should have been included in the new Act was a
provision for the inclusion in gross income of that portion of personal
injury awards representing "lost earnings." Additionally, the new Act
should have provided for the inclusion of any punitive damage awards
for personal injury.
The two ongoing issues that have surrounded section 104(a)(2)
have been the scope of the section, and more recently, the question of
whether juries should be informed of the tax consequences that may
result from any award made to the plaintiff. The first of these issues is
A ., : 4- c+ Areally a plaintiff-lI.R.S. dispute .laL Go not directl ,l., de=
fendants. The second of these issues, and the one that has received the
most recent attention, is more properly characterized as a plaintiff-de-
6. 1.R.C. § 104(a)(2) (1984).
7. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514 (1986) (hereinafter T.R.A. of 1986).
8. "President Reagan today signed into law the most thorough revision of the federal income
tax code in more than 40 years, calling the new tax system 'less a reform than a revolution.'
N.Y. Times, Oct. 23, 1986, at DI, col. 6.
9. Under the T.R.A. of 1986, the maximum rate has been lowered from 50% to 38.5% for
tax year 1987, and 28% for tax year 1988 and thereafter. There are two surcharges that will
effectively raise the tax rate, after 1987, to a 33% maximum on taxable income above certain
levels. For married couples the 33% bracket will apply to taxable income between $71,900 and at
least $149,250. For single taxpayers the 33% rate will apply to taxable income between $43,150
and $87,560. The upper end of these brackets will be expanded for each personal exemption
claimed by the taxpayer. The expansion will be $10,920 per exemption in 1988 and $11,200 per
exemption in 1989. I.R.C. §§ 1-3 (1984 & Supp. 1986).
10. Broadening the tax base is done by including more items into a taxpayer's gross income
or by decreasing deductions so that a taxpayer's taxable income will be larger. The T.R.A. of
1986 does both of these in its attempt to broaden the tax base to compensate for the lowered
maximum rates.
11. For example, § 123 of the T.R.A. of 1986 amends I.R.C. § 117 to limit the exclusion for
scholarships such that room and board allowances are now income; § 121 of T.R.A. of 1986
repeals the exclusion for unemployment compensation.
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fendant question, as it may or may not directly affect the size of any
award. For the most part, these two issues have been dealt with as
mutually exclusive problems, when in fact they are inextricably inter-
twined. When both issues are reviewed together, the economic realities
of the problems demand that changes be made.
This article will examine the history of section 104(a)(2), first by
looking to the present scope of the section as determined by the courts
and the perceived congressional intent bringing about the initial exemp-
tion.1" Second, it will turn to the unsettling, if proper, effect that judi-
cial decisions have had on the question of the jury's awareness of the
taxability or nontaxability of awards. Finally, the article will recom-
mend a solution, albeit a radical one from the perspective of plaintiffs,
that is based more on the economic realities of a personal injury award
than on a doubtful congressional intent perpetuated by the judiciary.
I. The Scope of Section 104(a)(2)
Section 104(a)(2) provided that:
Except in the case of amounts attributable to (and not in excess of)
deductions allowed under section 213 (relating to medical, etc., ex-
penses) for any prior taxable year, gross income does not include...
(2) the amount of any damages received (whether by suit or agree-
ment) on account of personal injuries or sickness .... 11
Additionally, the regulations provided that "damages .. .means an
amount received (other than workmen's compensation) through prose-
cution of a legal suit or action based upon tort or tort type14 rights, or
through a settlement agreement entered into in lieu of such
prosecution."' 6
As recently amended, 6 the statute now provides that amounts re-
ceived as damages for personal injuries, "whether as lump sums or as
periodic payments," are excluded from gross income.' 7 This amend-
ment means that an injured party can receive a damage award either in
a single payment or in periodic payments, also referred to as structured
settlements.' 8 In periodic payment awards, the award is actually made
12. See infra notes 23-50 and accompanying text.
13. I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) (1984).
14. See infra notes 26-27.
15. Treas. Reg. § 1.104-1(c) (1970).
16. I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) (1984).
17. This amendment codified a position already taken by the Service allowing for the exclu-
sion of periodic payments. I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) (1984).
18. Frolik, The Convergence of I.R.C. Sec. 104(a)(2), Norfolk & Western Railway Co. v.
1986-87] 409
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up of two components, the principal sum of the award plus interest.19
Since interest on damage awards is normally taxable, 0 the interest
generated from the investment of a lump sum award normally would be
subject to taxation. Such is not the case, however, under the so-called
structured settlement provided for by section 104(a)(2). What has been
created is a method for taxpayers to actually generate "interest in-
come" that is tax exempt. This clearly is at odds with the goal of pro-
moting horizontal equity.
The section limits the exclusion to natural persons, and the
amount of damages received are tax-exempt, whether the award results
from a final judgment or from a compromise settlement.21 The lan-
guage is broad and refers to "personal injuries" without distinguishing
between physical and non-physical injuries.22
A. Judicial Interpretation: Compensatory Damages
After the enactment in 1919 of section 213(b)(6) (now section
104(a)(2)), a the courts wasted little time in defining the exclusion.
Two requirements seemed readily apparent. First, the recovery must be
one based on a "tort or tort type" right, 2' and second, the recovery
must be for a personal injury. 5
Since there is no federal common law of torts, the state law con-
trols the determination of whether a claim is based on a tort or tort
type right. 21 Breach of contract to marry has been recognized since
1928 as a tort type right, and a recovery based on such a claim is
therefore nontaxable.2 7 This holding is in contrast to more recent con-
tract cases that have held that a contractual release of privacy rights
does not constitute a tort type claim.28 In Starrels v. Commissioner,
the court recognized the danger of a judicial expansion of the exemp-
Liepelt and Structured Tort Settlements: Tax Policy 'Derailed', 51 FORDHAM L. REV. 565, 566
(1982-83).
19. Id.
20. Riddle v. Commissioner, 27 B.T.A. 1339, 1341 (1933).
21. Comment, Income Tax Effects on Personal Injury Recoveries, 30 LA. L. REv. 672, 674
(1969-70).
22. id.
23. See infra notes 51-75 and accompanying text.
24. Middleton and Zorn, Tax Consequences of Recoveries for Personal Injury, 25 N.H.B.J.
137, 138 (1983-84).
25. id.
26. Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
27. McDonald v. Commissioner, 9 B.T.A. 1340, 1342 (1928); Acq. in result. 7-2 C.B. 185-86
(1928), Gen. Couns. Mem. 4363.
28. Starrels v. Commissioner, 304 F.2d 574 (9th Cir. 1962).
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tion by affirming the tax court's position that:
[I]f payments "could be made tax exempt by merely referring to a
right of privacy which was never invaded and possibly never intended
to be invaded, the narrowly conceived statutory exclusion for damages
on account of 'personal injuries' . . . would be expanded beyond its
normal meaning. We think Congress intended no such result. ''1"
As to the second requirement, common sense tells us that a physi-
cal injury is clearly a personal injury and it has been well settled that a
recovery for a physical injury is tax exempt.30 But courts long ago es-
tablished that recoveries for nonphysical injuries are also tax exempt.
In Hawkins v. Commissioners the court held that the amount received
by Hawkins was for a personal injury suffered by reason of a defama-
tory statement. Although Hawkins did present some evidence of injury
to his health, this case clearly established that a nonphysical injury was
within the scope of "personal injury.1
3 2
Today, section 104(a)(2) allows for tax exempt recoveries for
traditional injuries incurred in automobile accidents, from defective or
harmful products, and in slip-and-fall type accidents.33 It also goes well
beyond those injuries and provides for the excludability of compensa-
tory awards for libel and slander,"M breach of contract to marry,35
mental and physical strain and injury to health and personal reputation
in the community, 6 death of a spouse,3 7 and injuries to the body or
mind, whether intentionally or negligently caused.38
B. Judicial Interpretation: Punitive Damages
In personal injury cases the question of the excludability of puni-
29. Id. at 575.
30. Riddle, 27 B.T.A. at 1339. Damages awarded for injuries suffered in the sinking of the
steamship Lusitania in 1915 were excluded. The court said: "There is no controversy as to the
award of $15,000, in view of section 22(a)(5) of the Revenue Act of 1928, [the successor of §
213(b)(6) and the predecessor of § 104(a)(2)] which excludes from gross income damages re-
ceived on account of sickness or injuries." Id.
31. 6 B.T.A. 1023 (1927).
32. Id, at 1024-25.
33. I MERTENS LAW OF FEDERAL TAXATION § 7.20 (1986).
34. Rev. Rul. 58-418, 1958-2 C.B. 18, superceded by Rev. Rul. 85-98, 1985-2 C.B. 51. But
see infra notes 47-50 as to the inconsistent position of the I.R.S. as to punitive damages.
35. McDonald, 9 B.T.A. at 1340.
36. Seay v. Commissioner, 58 T.C. 32 (1972), Acq. in result, 1972-2 C.B. 3, 1972 I.R.B. No.
37 at 5.
37. Rev. Rul. 54-19, 1954-1 C.B. 179. But see infra note 48 and accompanying text as to
amounts received in a wrongful death action that are characterized as punitive damages.
38. 34 AM. JUR. 2d Federal Taxation § 5260 (1984).
1986-87]
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tive damages has not been conclusively resolved. In 1975, the Service
issued Revenue Ruling 75-45,39 which excluded from gross income pu-
nitive damages resulting from physical injury in a wrongful death
claim. The facts of this ruling were that the taxpayer was releasing a
right to assert a wrongful death claim in return for the monetary settle-
ment. Under the ruling payments made as a result of prosecution of
such a wrongful death action were deemed to be punitive in nature.4
However, in the area of libel cases, the Service has taken a position
different from that of Revenue Ruling 75-45. In Revenue Ruling 58-
418,"' the Service ruled that excludability of damages in a libel suit
depended on whether the damages were compensatory or exemplary.
The compensatory damages were excludable whereas the exemplary
damages were not. This position was maintained by the Service and
argued successfully at the trial level in Roemer v. Commissioner,2
where the tax court reconciled the inconsistent revenue rulings by
pointing out that Revenue Ruling 75-45 related to an award of dam-
ages due to personal injuries, whereas Revenue Ruling 58-418 related
to lost profits resulting from injury to business reputation.43 The Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals reversed this decision,44 but in reversing
failed to settle the question. The court found that damage to one's rep-
utation was a personal injury and thus, the resulting defamation suit
was for a personal injury.45 The court, in reaching this conclusion,
pointed out that whereas a defamatory attack on one's character may
impair both personal and professional relationships, all the damage
done flows from the same personal attack on the defamed individual. 46
In the matter of punitive damages, the court held that the damages
should be excluded, relying on Revenue Ruling 75-45, and what it per-
ceived to be a liberal interpretation by the Service of the language "any
damages" in section 104(a)(2). 7
In 1984, the Service clearly identified its position when it issued
Revenue Ruling 84-108.48 In this ruling the Service revoked Revenue
Ruling 75-45 and determined that punitive damages awarded in a
39. Rev. Rul. 75-45, 1975-1 C.B. 47.
40. Id.
41. Rev. Rul. 58-418, 1958-2 C.B. 18, superceded by Rev. Rul. 85-98, 1985-2 C.B. 51.
42. 79 T.C. 398 (1982).
43. Id. at 405-06.
44. Roemer v. Commissioner, 716 F.2d 693 (9th Cir. 1983).
45. Id. at 700.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Rev. Rul. 84-108, 1984-2 C.B. 32.
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wrongful death action were includable in the recipient's gross income.
In rationalizing this decision, the Service looked to the Supreme
Court's opinion in Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co.49 that punitive
damages in an antitrust case and punitive damages received in a fraud
case are includable in gross income because they are not a substitute
for any amounts lost by the plaintiff or a substitute for an injury to the
plaintiff or his property. 50 Then, citing Starrels v. Commissioner, in
which the Ninth Circuit held that only damages that compensate a tax-
payer for a loss are excluded under section 104(a)(2), the Service de-
termined that the punitive damages were not compensatory and there-
fore were not excludable.'
II. The Legislative History
On February 3, 1913, the sixteenth amendment 2 was ratified by
the states and became part of the Constitution. In March of that same
year, Woodrow Wilson became President and World War I was immi-
nent.53 With the entry into the war by the United States, Congress
appropriated nineteen billion dollars toward the war effort" and acted
to raise income taxes and lower exemptions. 5 The Revenue Act of
1918 was still in the Senate Finance Committee when World War I
ended in November, 1918.56 It eventually became law, although the
final version of the bill yielded only six billion dollars in revenue instead
of the seven to eight billion dollars called for.57 The Revenue Act of
1918 included section 213(b)(6), the predecessor of section 104(a)(2).
Against this brief historical background, it is appropriate to ex-
amine the legislative history of that Act 58 in an attempt to glean the
intent of Congress in creating the personal injury exclusion. Unfortu-
nately, on the actual expression of intent, the silence of Congress is
49. 348 U.S. 426 (1955).
50. Rev. Rul. 84-108, 1984-2 C.B. 32, 34.
51. Id. (citing Starrels v. Commissioner, 304 F.2d 574 (9th Cir. 1962)).
52. U.S. CONST. amend. XVI states: "The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes
on income, from whatever source derived, without apportionment among the several States, and
without regard to any census or enumeration."
53. R.E. PAUL, TAXATION FOR PROSPERITY 21 (1947).
54. Id. at 25.
55. Id. at 26.
56. Id. at 27.
57. R.E. PAUL, TAXATION IN THE UNITED STATES 116-17 (1954).
58. Revenue Act of 1918, Pub. L. No. 65-254, 40 Stat. 1057 (1919) (current version TAX
REFORM ACT OF 1986. Pub. L. No. 99-514 (1986)).
1986-871
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deafening. Examination of Senate5 and House of Representative 0
Hearings, Remarks by the Secretary of the Treasury,6' Hearings
Before the Senate Finance Committee,6 and the House Ways and
Means Committee,63 and the House and Senate Debates" yield no dis-
cussion of the provision itself. Indeed, there is contained but one refer-
ence regarding section 213(b)(6):
Under the present law it is doubtful whether amounts received
through accident or health insurance, or under workman's compensa-
tion acts, as compensation for personal injury or sickness, and dam-
ages received on account of such injuries or sickness, are required to
be included in gross income. The proposed bill provides that such
amounts shall not be included in gross income.6
This rather cryptic statement can be better understood if the chro-
nology of events that led to it are also examined. In January of 1915,
the Commissioner of Internal Revenue ruled that insurance proceeds,
received on account of an accident, were included as gross income to
the insured person. 66 By analogy, the Commissioner ruled that damages
for "pain and suffering" received from a lawsuit or compromise were in
fact no different than insurance proceeds, and thus were also includable
as gross income.67 In May and June of that same year, however, the
Supreme Court decided four cases that only served to muddy the wa-
ters.68 In these cases, the Court discussed the issue of how to distin-
guish taxable income from nontaxable return of capital, and in Doyle v.
Mitchell Brothers Co., it expressed the view that not all of the proceeds
of a conversion of capital assets were to be treated as income.69 Shortly
thereafter, the Secretary of Treasury inquired of the Attorney General
59. S. REP. No. 617, 65th Cong., 3rd Sess. (1918) (reprinted on microform Legislative His-
tory of Internal Revenue Acts, Revenue Act of 1918).
60. H.R. REP. No. 767, 65th Cong., 3rd Sess. (1918) (reprinted on microform Legislative
History of Internal Revenue Acts, Revenue Act of 1918).
61. Notes on the Revenue Act of 1918 by Sec'y. of Treas. (reprinted on microform Legisla-
tive History of Internal Revenue Acts, Revenue Act of 1918).
62. To Provide Revenue for War Purposes: Hearings on H.R. 12863 Before S. Comm. on
Finance, 65th Cong., 3rd Sess. (1918) (reprinted on microform Legislative History of Internal
Revenue Acts, Revenue Act of 1918).
63. Proposed Revenue Act of 1918; Hearings on H.R. 12863 Before House Comm. on Ways
and Means, 65th Cong., 3rd Sess. (1918) (reprinted on microform Legislative History of Internal
Revenue Acts, Revenue Act of 1918).
64. 57 CONG. REC. (1919). A study of references to the Revenue Act cited by the Index
reveals no discussion of § 213(b)(6).
65. H.R. REP. No. 767, 65th Cong., 3rd Sess. 9-10 (1918).
66. T.D. 2135, 17 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 39 (1915).
67. Id. at 42.
68. Lynch v. Hornby, 247 U.S. 339 (1918); Southern Pac. Co. v. Lowe, 247 U.S. 330
(1918); Lynch v. Turrish, 247 U.S. 221 (1918); Doyle v. Mitchell Bros. Co., 247 U.S. 179 (1918).
69. 247 U.S. 179, 184 (1918).
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as to his opinion regarding the taxability of accident insurance proceeds
received by a taxpayer on account of personal injury.70 In response, the
Attorney General discussed the recent Supreme Court decisions and
concluded by saying that:
Without affirming that the human body is in a technical sense the
"capital" invested in an accident policy, in a broad, natural sense the
proceeds of the policy do but substitute, so far as they go, capital
which is the source of future periodical income. They merely take the
place of capital in human ability which was destroyed by the accident.
They are therefore "capital" as distinguished from "income"
receipts."
This response was followed by a statement from the Commissioner
that the Treasury Department and the Service would agree with the
Attorney General and hold that neither accident insurance proceeds
nor damages received on account of personal injury would be taxed as
income.7" This position was codified in section 213(b)(6) of the Reve-
nue Act of 1918.
The exemption passed unchanged through the Revenue Act of
1939 as section 22(b)(5),71 and through the Internal Revenue Act of
1954 as section 104(a)(2).7 4 It was not until 1982 that the section was
amended. At that time it was noted that the reason for the change was
a desire on the part of Congress to clarify by statute the position al-
ready taken by the Service "that periodic payments as personal injury
damages are excludable from gross income of the recipient."' 75 The ex-
planation went on to state that "[t]his provision is intended to codify,
rather than change, the present law.
' 7
1
That Congress intended personal injury damages to be tax exempt
is fairly clear, but the underlying policy reasons for this exemption are
not clear and have been subject to various interpretations since the ex-
emption was promulgated. In the absence of an express policy state-
ment by Congress 7" the courts and commentators have found it neces-
sary to construe congressional intent when dealing with section
70. 31 Op. Att'y Gen. 304 (1918); see also Cutler, Taxation of the Proceeds of Litigation,
57 COLUM. L. REv. 470 (1957).
71. 31 Op. Att'y Gen. at 308.
72. T.D. 2747, 20 Treas. Dec. int. Rev. 457 (1918).
73. I.R.C. § 22(b)(5) (1939) (current version at I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) (1984)).
74. I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) (1954) (current version at I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) (1984)).
75. S. REP. No. 646, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 4580, 4583; see supra notes 16-20 and accompanying text.
76. Id.




The primary aim in measuring damages in ordinary tort actions is
compensation.78 This has been defined as giving an award of money to
the injured person that will, as nearly as possible, place him in the
position he would be in if there had in fact been no injury. In Hawkins,
the court relied on this basic tort theory of compensation to justify the
holding that damages received by petitioner for personal injury were
not taxable income.7 9 Twelve years later the Tax Board of Appeals
ruled in Clark v. Commissioner" that a damage award was tax-exempt
under the theory that it was "compensation for a loss which impaired
petitioner's capital."81 This same rationale was also adopted by the
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals when it held that compensation was a
true measure of damages and that it must be figured by estimating the
dollar equivalent of the damage done by the tortious act.82 In 1955, the
Supreme Court in Glenshaw Glass Co. held that punitive damages in
an antitrust award were taxable.83 In reaching this decision the Court
noted that personal injury damages were not taxable on the theory that
they corresponded to a return of capital and that they were by defini-
tion compensatory only.84
In that same year, the Supreme Court of Illinois in Hall v. Chi-
cago & Northwestern Railway Co.,85 reversed the Illinois Court of Ap-
peals86 on the issue of whether a jury should be informed of the tax
exempt status of the damage award. In defending its decision the lower
court stated that, "if the jury were to mitigate the damages ...by
reason of the income tax exemption ...then the very Congressional
78. This theory of compensation of an injured person is the central core of tort law. It is
generally believed that the injured should be compensated by those who were to blame for the
injury. Tort law developed as the primary means of providing redress for the injury. See generally
G. E. WHITE, TORT LAW IN AMERICA (1980).
79. Hawkins, 6 B.T.A. at 1025. The court said that the damages were an "attempt to make
the plaintiff whole as before the injury." Id.
80. 40 B.T.A. 333 (1939).
81. Id. at 335.
82. Farmers' & Merchants' Bank v. Commissioner, 59 F.2d 912 (6th Cir. 1932).
83. 348 U.S. 426, 432 (1955).
84. Id. at 432, n.8.
The long history of departmental rulings holding personal injury recoveries non-taxable
on the theory that they roughly correspond to a return of capital cannot support exemp-
tion of punitive damages following injury to property. See 2 Cum. Bull. 71; I-I Cum.
Bull. 92, 93; VII-2 Cum. Bull. 123; 1954-1 Cum. Bull. 179, 180. Damages for personal
injury are by definition compensatory only. Punitive damages, on the other hand, con-
not be considered a restoration of capital for taxation purposes.
85. 5 Ill. 2d 135, 125 N.E.2d 77 (1955).
86. 349 Ill. App. 175, 110 N.E.2d 654 (1953).
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intent of the income tax law to give an injured party a tax benefit
would be nullified." 87 This case departed from the previous "return of
capital" and "damages as compensation" rationale and instead imputed
to Congress a humanitarian intent to benefit an injured party.
This same reasoning was adopted by the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals in Epmeier v. United States88 when it stated that the provi-
sions of section 22(b)(5) (now 104(a)(2)) were undoubtedly intended
to relieve a taxpayer who has the misfortune to become ill or injured.89
This humanitarian approach was not readily accepted, however. In
1962, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Starrels v. Commissioner
decided the issue based on the Glenshaw Glass Co. reasoning that there
can be no "exemption of payments made for injuries which have never
occurred because such payments are not compensatory and hence can-
not be considered a restoration of capital." 0
III. Litigation
For more than twenty-five years after section 104(a)(2) was first
promulgated, the nontaxability of damage awards for personal injuries
was not a significant issue in the actual litigation of cases." As tax
rates and the number of taxpayers increased, however, there was a
heightened awareness and sensitivity on the part of defense attorneys to
the tax effects on their clients in personal injury suits involving loss of
future earnings.92 The primary focus has been in two areas: 1) whether
the anticipated future income of the injured party should be calculated
based upon gross (before tax) earnings or net (after tax) earnings; and
2) whether courts should permit juries to be instructed as to the non-
taxable nature of personal injury awards.93
In attempting to decrease the actual award from a "gross" amount
to a "net" amount defense attorneys have tried to introduce into evi-
dence the amount of income tax the plaintiff was paying prior to his
injury. Most arguments against such evidence, and in favor of using the
gross income as the measure of damages rely on the premise that the
future tax rates of the individual plaintiff are too speculative to predict
87. Hall, 5 Ill. 2d at 152, 125 N.E.2d at 86.
88. 199 F.2d 508 (7th Cir. 1952). The case was dealing with insurance benefits that were tax
exempt, but discussed the humanitarian intent behind § 22(b)(5).
89. Id. at 511.
90. Starrels, 304 F.2d 574, 577 (9th Cir. 1962).
91. Nordstrom, Income Taxes and Personal Injury Awards. 19 OHIO ST. L.J. 212 (1958).
92. Id. at 212-13.
93. Mayor and Hepburn, The Treatment of Income Taxes in Determining Personal Injury
Awards, 18 JURIMETRICS J. 186 (1977-78).
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and that the computations required to accurately assess the net income
are too complex to perform or evaluate properly even if done by a tax
expert, let alone a jury.
94
The purpose for defense attorneys wanting to give the jury instruc-
tion that the award is tax exempt is ostensibly that if no such instruc-
tion is given, the jury will add on an amount it erroneously believes the
plaintiff will have to pay in income tax to the already calculated
amount of damages. Arguments used in this context are that juries
have been awarding larger and larger awards in recent years due to
inflation and the growth of the economy, and that the general public
has become more tax conscious through the media, particularly
through publicity given to the gameshow winners of the 1950's.11 There
has been an intense legal analysis of this litigation issue in recent years,
both in favor of and against the "net income" proposition. This article
is not intended to critique those analyses and will merely summarize
the basic premises upon which the analyses were founded.
In a leading commentary96 Nordstrom evaluates the first of the
two litigation issues. When discussing the issue of measuring damages,
the premise adopted is that recovery for future income has as its pri-
mary purpose the compensation of the victim, not the punishment of
the defendant. 97 The article goes on to discuss opposing arguments in-
cluding the proposition that using a "net income" approach to damages
frustrates the intent of Congress to bestow a benefit on the injured
party.98 The author's counterargument is that this intent was not what
motivated Congress to enact section 104(a)(2); Congress merely
wanted to clear up the confusion as to whether tort damages were in-
come under the sixteenth amendment.99
Another article devoted entirely to the issue of cautionary jury in-
structions adopts the rationale that the plaintiff will receive a more ad-
equate award if the instructions are given.100 While never expressly
mentioning congressional intent, the article does endorse the theory
that the purpose of damages in negligence cases is to make the plaintiff
94. Id. at 187-88.
95. Knachel, Jury Instructions on Tax Exemption in Personal Injury Cases, 6 CLEV.-MAR.
L. REV. 71 (1957).
96. Nordstrom, supra note 91, at 212.
97. Id. at 219.
98. Id. at 222.
99. Id. at 222-23.
100. Roettger, The Cautionary Instruction on Income Taxes in Negligence Actions, 18
WASH. & LEE L. REV. I, 14 (1961).
418 [Vol. 9:407
FEDERAL TAX EXEMPTION
"whole," not to give him a bonus.10'
A third commentary states that Congress intended to treat dam-
age awards under section 104(a)(2) as restoration of lost capital.1
0 2 Us-
ing this as a starting point, the author concludes that the jury should be
informed as to the tax consequences of the damage award.'03 The basis
for this conclusion seems to be that the jury would, in the absence of
such instructions, increase the award for tax purposes and thereby give
the plaintiff an undeserved and unjust windfall. 04
Yet a fourth view advocates the full disclosure to the jury regard-
ing the tax consequences of personal injury awards for lost income. 105
The jury should be informed of the tax exemption and should be in-
structed that they should not, therefore, recompense the plaintiff for
taxes that they believe would have been due on the award.1'0 Further,
evidence of the plaintiff's past tax history should be admissible and
should be used to reduce his estimated future gross income to a net
figure which would serve as a basis for the award. 0 7 A key factor in
this analysis is the author's conclusion that Congress never intended to
benefit an injured plaintiff when it created the exemption. 108 Without
evidence of such an intent, the article urges that it would be "wise to
follow the general rule of damages, and only restore to the plaintiff that
which he has lost."' 10 9
Finally, and what certainly seems to be a minority view within the
area of legal commentary, is the position that gross earnings should be
the appropriate basis for damage awards." 0 The proponent of this the-
ory argues that, although Congress originally did not intend to confer a
tax benefit through the exemption, the section has not been repealed
primarily because of the prevailing public policy to not overburden an
injured plaintiff; a "net earnings" rule would defeat this public
policy.
111
These issues have received very different treatment from the
101. Id.
102. Burns, A Compensation Award for Personal Injury or Wrongful Death Is Tax Exempt:
Should We Tell the Jury? 14 DE PAUL L. Rav. 320 (1964-65).
103. Id. at 332.
104. Id. at 331.
105. Note, Personal Injuries: Should Non-Taxability of Judgments Decrease Award? 8
TULSA L.J. 242 (1972).
106. Id. at 251,
107. Id.
108. Id. at 244.
109. Id. at 252.




courts. For the most part, the view supported by a majority of cases is
that, in fixing damages for loss of future earnings in personal injury
suits, the income tax consequences should not be taken into considera-
tion. 1 2 Further, the basis for the damage award should be the plain-
tiff's gross income with no reduction in this amount by any income tax
saving that may result because of the tax exempt treatment of the
award. 113 Generally, the same can be said about the question of jury
instructions. The majority of courts have held that the incidence of in-
come taxation should not be included in jury instructions nor communi-
cated to the jury during the trial itself."' Attention should be given to
the judicial reasoning behind these decisions as they relate to the vari-
ous interpretations of congressional intent.
In Dempsey v. Thompson"5 the court based the damages on gross
income because of the perceived impossibility of adequately computing
tax liability, but held that the jury instructions regarding tax exemp-
tion were allowable at the trial court's discretion." 6 A later Illinois
case, Hall v. Chicago & Northwest Railway Co., disagreed with part
of the holding in Dempsey and held that the issue of taxation was not a
proper factor for a jury's consideration imparted either by oral argu-
ment or written instrument." 7 In its explanation, the court stated that
if the jury were to decrease the amount of plaintiff's award because of
the tax exemption it would nullify the congressional intent to bestow a
tax benefit on the injured party." 8 This decision was later cited with
approval by the Supreme Court of Ohio."19
In a 1963 Tennessee case'10 the court analyzed and adopted the
majority view that the jury should not be instructed about the tax ex-
empt treatment of the award. The court noted that the rationale for
this view was, in part, that Congress intended to bestow a tax benefit
through the exemption.' 2'
112. See generally Annotation, Propriety of Taking Income Tax into Consideration in Fix-
ing Damages in Personal Injury or Death Action, 63 A.L.R.2D 1393 (1959) and 16 A.L.R.4TH
589 (1982).
113. 63 A.L.R.2D at 1395-96 (1959).
114. Id. at 1408. See also infra notes 159-60 and accompanying text.
115. 363 Mo. 339, 251 S.W.2d 42 (1952).
116. Id. at 45.
117. 5 111. 2d at 152, 125 N.E.2d at 86.
118. Id.
119. Maus v. New York, Chicago & St. Louis Rd. Co., 165 Ohio St. 281, 135 N.E.2d 253
(1956).
120. Dixie Feed & Seed Co. v. Byrd, 52 Tenn. App. 619, 376 S.W.2d 745 (Tenn. Ct. App.
1963).
121. Id. at 627, 376 S.W.2d at 749.
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Federal cases had generally been in accord with this view. 2' In
Huddell v. Levin'2" the district court decided to follow the "gross earn-
ings" rule as it was the rule in New Jersey and because it was consis-
tent with the humanitarian intent of Congress as perceived by the
court.'" By 1980 all but one of the circuit courts of appeals had
adopted the traditional "gross earnings" rule, or its modified form.
Only the Ninth Circuit admitted evidence of future taxation in all
cases.
25
The seemingly settled state of the law in this area came to an end
in 1980, however, with the Supreme Court decision of Norfolk &
Western Railway Co. v. Liepelt,'2 a wrongful death action orginally
brought in Illinois under the Federal Employer's Liability Act
(FELA).117 Appellant Norfolk & Western argued that the trial court
erred in excluding evidence showing the effect that income taxes would
have had on the decedent's estimated future earnings, and that it also
erred in refusing to allow a jury instruction that said: "[Ylour award
will not be subject to any income taxes, and you should not consider
such taxes in fixing the amount of your award."'" 8 It was error, appel-
lant reasoned, because absent evidence of the effects of taxation the
claimants would receive substantially more than the value of the loss
they had suffered. Further, if a cautionary jury instruction were not
given, the jury would award claimants a bonus in the form of taxes that
would have been paid on the award if it were taxable. 2 9 Claimant ar-
gued that Congress never intended to limit the recovery to the net value
of the loss suffered, because Congress intended to bestow a humanita-
rian benefit on tort victims through the tax exemption of section
104(a)(2), and if a windfall did occur it belonged to the injured
party.
30
Writing for the majority, 31 Justice Stevens reversed the Illinois
122. See, e.g., McWeeney v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 282 F.2d 34 (2d Cir. 1960); Stokes
v. U.S., 144 F.2d 82 (2d Cir. 1944); Combs v. Chicago, St. Paul, M. & 0. Ry. Co., 135 F. Supp.
750 (N.D. Iowa 1955).
123. 395 F. Supp. 64 (D.N.J. 1975).
124. Id. at 89.
125. Note, Evidence or Jury Instruction on Impact of Income Taxes on FELA Damage
Awards, 34 TAx LAw 483, 486 (1980-81).
126. 444 U.S. 490 (1980).
127. 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1986).
128. 444 U.S. at 492.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. 444 U.S. 490. Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of the Court in which Chief Justice
Burger, and Justices Brennan, Stewart, White, Powell, and Rehnquist joined.
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decision on both counts. His analysis of the issues stressed that under
the FELA recoverable damages are measured in terms of the pecuniary
loss that the decedent's beneficiaries might establish in a wrongful
death action. 112 Accordingly, Justice Stevens wrote, "it is his after-tax
income, rather than his gross income before taxes, that provides the
only realistic measure of the decedent's ability to support his fam-
ily.' 1 33 In ruling that it was error to refuse the requested jury instruc-
tion, Justice Stevens quoted the Ninth Circuit to the effect that giving
the instruction would not hurt and would help prevent any overcompen-
sation to the plaintiff in case the jury erroneously assumed that the
award would be taxed and correspondingly inflated the award.3
Justices Blackmun and Marshall dissented, with Justice Blackmun
writing the opinion. While noting that admitting tax evidence regard-
ing net earnings and allowing the cautionary jury instruction might be
urged as common sense and as a recognition of the financial realities,
he disagreed with the majority. The basis of his dissent rests in the use
of net income in calculating lost earnings. 35 In his view Congress had
clearly created a benefit when it decided not to tax personal injury
damage awards, and while there was no clear articulation of the under-
lying reasons for this, Justice Blackmun reasoned that it was unlikely
Congress intended to benefit the tortfeasor instead. 36 Rather, he
opined that perhaps Congress had wanted to avoid the administrative
difficulties involved in calculating a tax on future income. In the alter-
native, he pointed out that Congress may have intended to confer a
humanitarian benefit on the victim or victims of the tort. 37 The major-
ity opinion he felt, was inconsistent with both of these purposes. 138 Re-
garding the question of jury instructions, Justice Blackmun stated that
such instructions would only be burdensome and confusing to the jury,
and was almost an affront to the jury's practical wisdom.139
The Leipelt decision is most significant in the area of federal
law."40 Since the case was decided solely under FELA, it is not binding
132. Id. at 493.
133. Id. at 493.
134. Id. at 498 (quoting Burlington Northern, Inc. v. Boxberger, 529 F.2d 284, 297 (9th Cir.
1975)).
135. 444 U.S. at 499. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
136. Id. at 501-02.
137. Id. at 501.
138. Id. at 503.
139. Id.
140. Frolik, supra note 18, at 600.
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on state courts when federal law is not a basis for decision.14 1 In addi-
tion to affecting all FELA actions, 42 however, Liepelt will probably
govern in wrongful death and personal injury actions brought under the
Jones Act and under the Death on the High Seas Act (DOHSA) s
Liepelt may ultimately have an effect on civil rights actions brought
under section 1983'" which protects persons from deprivation of their
civil rights by persons acting under color of state law. 45 It has been
suggested that since an action under section 1983 is governed by fed-
eral law the courts must follow Liepelt for any part of an award that is
nontaxable.'" There is disagreement among commentators as to
whether Liepelt will have any effect on suits for damages brought
under the Federal Tort Claims Act.
47
A proponent of Liepelt contends that it will facilitate a more accu-
rate determination by the jury of what kind of damage award the
claimant should fairly receive.' 48 Critics of Liepelt, however, argue that
under Liepelt section 104(a)(2) will not subsidize claimants, as Con-
gress probably intended, but will instead reduce the liability of defend-
ants in personal injury suits. '4 9 Further, the one who may ultimately
benefit from the tax exemption and receive the windfall will be the
defendant's casualty insurance company. 50 Finally, since Congress has
apparently countenanced any overcompensation to the tort victim by
not repealing or amending section 104(a)(2), the Liepelt majority erred
in ignoring this congressional intent when it admitted the taxability
evidence. '5
IV. Present Status
The Supreme Court's decision in Liepelt is, among other things, a
microcosm of the policy conflict surrounding section 104(a)(2) since its
141. Comment, Income Taxation and the Calculation of Tort Damage Awards: The Ramifi-
cations of Norfolk & Western Railway v. Liepelt, 38 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 289 (1981).
142. Frolik, supra note 18, at 591.
143. Id. at 592 (citing The Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 688 (Supp. 1986); Death on the High
Seas Act, 46 U.S.C. §§ 761-68 (1976 & Supp. 1986)).
144. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).
145. Comment, supra note 141, at 301.
146. Id.
147. "'Liepelt may have a greater-than-expected effect on the measure of damages for cases
brought under the FTCA." Frolik, supra note 18, at 593. "Since Liepelt is not binding on state
damages law, Liepelt is not controlling in FTCA actions." Comment, supra note 141, at 300.
148. Note, supra note 125, at 494.
149. Frolik, supra note 18, at 594; see also Comment, supra note 141, at 296-97.
150. Frolik, supra note 18, at 594-95.
151. Comment, supra note 141, at 297.
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inception. The majority opinion speaks for those courts and commenta-
tors who believe that personal injury damages should only be sufficient
to make the victim "whole." They believe that Congress had this view
and only created the exemption to further this policy, and that damage
awards only reflect a "return of capital" rather than income.
An objective examination of the legislative history reveals no ex-
press statement as to this elusive intent. The administrative and judicial
activities that took place at the time the exemption was promulgated
lead to the conclusion that Congress did, in fact, merely seek to codify
the conclusion already reached by the Treasury Department and the
Attorney General that personal injury damages were not income under
the sixteenth amendment and were, therefore, not taxable.152 This anal-
ysis is effectively utilized by those who support the majority opinion of
Liepelt. The logical extension of this is that damage awards should be
reduced to the amount that the victim would have realized as net in-
come and the award should not be inflated by the jury in the belief that
taxes would have to be paid on it.
At the same time, an examination of the actions of Congress since
1918 leads to the conclusion that Congress intended to continue the tax
exemption, even in an era when taxes55 and damages are high"" and
152. See supra notes 59-72 and accompanying text.
153. Although the recent tax history shows a decrease in maximum tax rates, that is a rela-
tively new phenomenon. The original rate in 1913 had a maximum rate of 7% and was gradually
increased to a maximum rate of 92% in 1952. (A maximum rate of 94% was imposed in 1944-45
in response to the increased demands of World War !1.) J. PECHMAN, FEDERAL TAX POLICY 302
(1983).
154. The evidence suggests that a substantial but uneven increase in verdict awards has
been occurring for years. For the past 10 years, the average yearly increase in verdict
awards is 15.23%. For 1984 it was 15.36%, and for 1985, the increase is 12.24% using






The increase in 1981 was almost thrice that of 1984, and 2- h times the preliminary figure of
12.24% for 1985. You will note that verdicts peaked in 1981, and have been decreasing
since. Our report gives equal weight to changes in the midpoint verdict and the unad-
justed verdict average. The unusually high verdicts rendered in some years do, unques-
tionably, affect the unadjusted averages. If verdicts of high and low extremes were ex-
cluded from these calculations, we believe that the fluctuations would be smaller and
the yearly average increase would also be somewhat smaller.
Testimony on the Liability Crisis Focusing on the Facts of the Insurance Crisis, reprinted in, P.
HERMANN. REP. TO THE SUBCOMM. ON ECONOMIC STABILIZATION OF THE COMM. ON BANKING.
FINANCE AND URBAN AFFAIRS, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (Jury Verdict Research, Inc.
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have become a significant issue in personal injury litigation. This intent
is manifested in the recent amendment of section 104(a)(2) that not
only perpetuates the section's existence but also seems to broaden its
scope.1 8 Those proponents of the "humanitarian intent" view expressed
in Justice Blackmun's dissent in Liepelt,156 rightly seize upon this as a
proper justification for the belief that it is the present intent of Con-
gress to confer a benefit on the tort victim and that a jury should not
take taxes into account in handing down damage awards.
Both views of congressional intent are at least partially correct,
and both have been convincingly argued in order to justify the desired
result. There does, however, seem to be a much more basic issue that is
threatened by Liepelt, and that is the issue of fairness and consistency
of awards. Whether Congress in 1918 and thereafter chose to provide
for such an exemption out of feelings of generosity, pity, fear of bad
publicity, or mistaken beliefs as to the nature of such an award, it is
clear today that section 104(a)(2) is not providing consistent treatment,
that is, horizontal equity157 among taxpayers. A brief summary should
point out the deficiencies now operating within section 104(a)(2).
Originally, the section, through judicial interpretation, allowed for
the exclusion of all damages for personal injury. This was true whether
those damages were for pain and suffering, medical expenses, mental
anguish, or lost wages; and the courts did not distinguish among com-
pensatory, exemplary, or punitive damages.1 The language "any dam-
ages" was given the broadest possible interpretation. More recently,
some courts, aided by the Supreme Court's decision in Liepelt, have
constructively repealed the tax exemption of section 104(a)(2) by nulli-
fying its effects on damage awards. In those courts that follow both
prongs of the message of Liepelt, the jury will be aware of the tax-
exempt nature of any damages and can adjust its award accordingly. In
addition, the calculation of damages will be made on a "net income"
theory as opposed to a gross income theory. However, in the non-
Liepelt jurisdictions, damage awards are still made on a gross income
theory and juries are not informed of the non-taxability of such awards.
There is still a third group of courts that have adopted the second part
of Liepelt,1" and allow jury instructions to the effect that damages are
August 6, 1986).
155. See supra notes 16-20 and accompanying text.
156. 444 U.S. 490, 498 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
157. See supra note 3.
158. See supra notes 23-38 and accompanying text.
159. For a detailed history of the lower courts that allow or disallow a jury instruction as to
the tax consequences, and those states that allow evidence of net income, see Frolik, supra note
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not taxable. Thus, the jury hears a damage plea based on the "gross
income" theory, and then is left to its own devices to adjust the award.
The choice of forum, the basis of the case, and the degree of sophistica-
tion in a jury all now have an impact on the prospective award that a
plaintiff might receive.
In addition, with the issuance of Revenue Ruling 84-108, the Ser-
vice has taken the position that punitive damages are not within the
scope of the section 104(a)(2) exemption. While that question remains
unclear, 160 plaintiffs receiving punitive damages face a Service dedi-
cated to including those damages in gross income.
This has created mass uncertainty as to the award a particular
jury might arrive at through its determination, which is sometimes in-
fluenced by information of the tax consequences and sometimes arrived
at with little or no consideration of the tax consequences. The results
can be quite varied, but can generally be categorized as follows. With
section 104(a)(2) in its present state, those jurisdictions that have not
adopted Liepelt' 61 or a similar theory are likely to arrive at inflated
awards by allowing for plaintiff's payment of taxes on the award. Such
an inflated award, when in fact it is tax-exempt, provides a windfall to
the plaintiff and concurrently penalizes the defendant to the extent he
is found liable to pay taxes that are not required to be paid by the
plaintiff. While it is possible for the jury to arrive at a correct decision,
from the tax aspects, past history indicates that this is not the likely
result, as juries are not usually aware of the tax-exempt nature of these
damages.162
On the other hand, if Liepelt is followed, it is likely that damage
awards will decrease as juries are informed of the tax exemption. Ide-
ally, this would result in awards that are more accurate when consider-
ing what the plaintiff has actually lost, thus eliminating or reducing the
likelihood of a windfall to the plaintiff and a penalty to the defendant.
It has been argued that this only benefits the defendant, 163 and the
system should not provide a windfall to the wrongful party, but it can
be equally argued that if the plaintiff has been adequately compensated
the defendant is not receiving a windfall. There is nothing wrong with
18, at 587-88 nn. 101-06.
160. The conflict still exists between the Service's position and the Ninth Circuit's decision in
Roemer, 716 F.2d at 693. It appears that only congressional action or the Supreme Court will
ultimately resolve the conflict.
161. For a detailed listing of the jurisdictions that have chosen not to adopt a Liepelt or a
similar theory, see Frolik, supra note 18, at 586 n.101.
162. Knachel, supra note 95.
163. Frolik, supra note 18, at 594-95.
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the defendant not having to pay a windfall to the plaintiff. The more
immediate problems that arise from the two prongs of Liepelt are the
speculative nature of taxes, the possible inaccuracies in trying to pro-
ject future "net earnings" based on uncertain future tax rates,164 and
the possible confusion to a jury when, after hearing a damage plea
based on the "net income" theory, it is instructed to take into account
the tax-exempt nature of the awards.
As an alternative, one commentator has called for the repeal of
section 104(a)(2) at least as to damages for "lost wages."' 65 While this
possible solution has certain merit, it does not fully eliminate the possi-
ble inconsistent treatment that could occur. For without the tax-exemp-
tion of section 104(a)(2), there are still several possible results depend-
ing upon whether or not the court has followed Liepelt. In a
jurisdiction that does not follow the theory of Liepelt, it is entirely pos-
sible for a jury to inflate the award for income taxes, thus arriving at
an award that does adequately compensate the plaintiff. If a jury does
not adjust an award for income taxes, it is likely that plaintiff will end
up with substantially less than the jury intended. In such a case, the
defendant has received a windfall at the expense of the plaintiff.
In those jurisdictions that have adopted the second prong of the
Liepelt theory, the jury should be able to determine an accurate award
based on current tax rates and on the damages they wish to award to
plaintiff. The defendant would, in essence, pay the tax, but there would
be no windfall to either plaintiff or defendant. If there were a windfall
it would be to the government. In those jurisdictions that have fully
embraced the Liepelt doctrine, the net income calculation of damages
is so speculative as to make any calculation more a "shot in the dark"
than a fairly reasoned determination of the plaintiffs actual damage
from his lost earnings.
V. A Recommendation
What was once a well settled question, or at least one that gener-
ated little concern, has been turned into a quagmire of uncertainty for
both plaintiffs and defendants. The Liepelt decision, the "structured
settlement" amendment of section 104(a)(2), Revenue Ruling 84-108,
and what has always been questionable congressional intent have made
the tax-exempt status of personal injury damage awards both compli-
cated and unpredictable. A clarification by Congress is needed. This
164. Id. at 595. ,
165. Id. at 603.
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article recommends a solution in two parts. Part one is that Congress
should repeal section 104(a)(2) in its present state and should enact
new legislation providing for the excludability of personal injury dam-
ages only to the extent they are a reimbursement for actual expenses,
pain and suffering, mental anguish, and loss of services. Specifically not
within the scope of any new legislation, and thus clearly includable in
gross income, should be any awards for lost earnings and for punitive
damages. While this directly contradicts those arguments based on a
humanitarian intent to exclude such damages, it seems only too logical
that a plaintiff, fully compensated for injuries not based on earnings,
needs no more humanitarianism than any other taxpayer who is re-
quired to pay his annual extraction of taxes on his earnings. If, in fact,
the ultimate goal of damages is to make the plaintiff whole and return
him to the position he would have been in without the injury, then sub-
jecting the damages for lost earnings to the income tax truly puts him
back where he would have been. Further, it is clear from the character-
ization of punitive damages that they are not intended to compensate
the plaintiff but are instead intended to penalize the defendant and
should never have been brought within the exemption of section
104(a)(2).
As discussed above, however, merely subjecting these damages to
the income tax may not eliminate the possible inconsistencies and wind-
falls that might o-ur. To that exte, part t,,, of thetol ution requires
the federal and state courts to adopt the second prong of the Liepelt
theory and allow jury instructions detailing the taxability and non-tax-
ability of damages. That prong of the Liepelt decision dealing with the
"net income" theory of calculating damages should be overruled by the
Supreme Court. As Justice Blackmun in his dissent, and several critics
have pointed out, this theory is far too speculative. As recent history
proves, tax rates can change dramatically from year to year, 166 and
individual taxpayer's taxable income can vary annually as a result of
deductions and personal exemptions,167 and even a change in marital
status'68 can alter the tax impact from year to year. Thus, attempting
to base damages on the "net income" theory can produce extremely
166. In 1980 the maximum tax rate applied to individuals was 70%. The Economic Recovery
Tax Act of 1981 brought about a reduction of this maximum rate to 50% and most recently the
Tax Reform Act of 1986 will lower the maximum rate to 28%. I.R.C. § 1(j) (1986).
167. This is not solely a problem of changes in the amount of a taxpayer's personal deduc-
tions, although such changes could certainly affect the tax, but also a change in the tax laws either
authorizing new deductions or repealing past deductions.
168. For a detailed explanation of the effects of marriage on a taxpayer see Chapman, Mar-
riage Neutrality: An Old Idea Comes of Age. 87 W. VA. L. REv. 335 (1984-85).
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unfair and unpredictable results.'69
On the other hand, when jury instructions on the taxability of
damages for lost earnings are allowed the jury can make a reasoned
decision as to the amount it feels will adequately compensate the plain-
tiff, and adjust it for the income tax that will be levied. The problem of
"speculative" calculations will be avoided by allowing the jury to take
into account the taxes after hearing damages based on gross earnings.
Since the plaintiff will be taxed only in the year of receipt and the jury
will know the current tax rates, the jury can then calculate what it
desires the plaintiff to recover and set the award to give exactly the
amount necessary for the plaintiff to "net" the proper amount.
In the past, such a change in the taxability of damages could have
created a serious income bunching problem,' but with the passage of
the Tax Reform Act of 1986 the potential for such a problem has been
limited. With the lowering and flattening of the tax rate schedule, the
adverse tax consequences on bunched income inherent in a progressive,
marginal tax system have been minimized. Congress has demonstrated,
by repealing the income-averaging provisions"7 and doing away with
the preferential treatment of capital gains,172 that it no longer perceives
a need to afford relief from income bunching. Thus, the plaintiff will
not face a substantially more burdensome tax liability from receiving
his lost earnings in a lump sum than he would from receiving it over
the number of years used in making the projection.
A second area of concern that taxing damages for lost earnings
might raise is the problem of allocation of damages between lost earn-
ings and excludable damages. 173 This is not to be ignored; it is a prob-
169. As an example, suppose a taxpayer were to be awarded "several years of lost earnings,"
and the damages had been calculated on the net earning theory prior to the T.R.A. of 1986. The
earnings would have been reduced by a tax rate that could range as high as 50% to calculate the
,.net" amount. However, some of those earnings attributable to 1987 or thereafter would only
have to be taxed at 28%. This could lead to an error as high as 22% by using the net earnings
theory.
170. Income bunching has historically increased the tax burden because of the progressive,
marginal tax system. By bunching income into one year, instead of over several years, the tax-
payer loses the benefit of having some of the income taxed at the bottom of the schedules in each
year. Instead the bunched income will only benefit the lower rates in the one year. Additionally,
bunching has the effect of subjecting the last dollars to a higher marginal rate than they would be
subjected to if they were earned over a period of years.
171. Section 141 of the T.R.A. of 1986 repeals §§ 1301-05 of the Code.
172. Section 301 of the T.R.A. of 1986 repeals § 1202, which provided for the 60% deduc-
tion on net capital gains. As a result, capital gains, which are actually accumulated appreciation,
are taxed as a lump sum at ordinary income tax rates.
173. If in fact Congress were to amend § 104(a)(2) to tax the damages from lost earnings
and punitive damages, it would be beneficial to plaintiffs to have as much of any award as possible
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lem that can be dealt with. In resolving questions of allocation, the
courts have relied on the "payor's intent" test.17 4 Under this test the
court will not normally investigate the validity of an underlying claim
but, instead, will attempt to determine the intent of the payor. As one
court held:
When the terms of an agreement result from deliberate negotiations
this Court is not prone to give it a different interpretation. However,
when the agreement neither conforms to the business or economic re-
alities of the situation nor is the product of conflicting tax interests,
we believe it is appropriate for this Court to examine the surrounding
circumstances and make our own determination.
7 5
Subjecting any settlement agreement to judicial scrutiny, when appro-
priate, is essential to verify the validity of the characterization, and it
also provides a mechanism to prevent abuses.
VI. Conclusion
Section 104(a)(2) provides for the exclusion from income taxation
of damages awarded for personal injury. The congressional intent be-
hind this exclusion is at best not clear. The scope of the exclusion ini-
tially was broadened to include all damages, but there is little justifica-
tion for including in this tax-exempt treatment either damages for lost
earnings or punitive damages. Although the Service has recently chal-
lenged the excludability of punitive damages, it has not raised the issue
of the taxability of damages from lost earnings. Instead, it is the parties
and the courts who have taken up this question, through the develop-
ment of the net earnings theory of Liepelt and the introduction of jury
instructions on the taxability of damage awards.
At the same time Congress has amended section 104(a)(2) to al-
low total exclusion for structured settlements. This only aggravates an
already confused situation and promotes unequal treatment of similarly
situated taxpayers.
The result has been an inconsistent and at times unfair system
that may provide a windfall to the plaintiff or the defendant. Whether
punitive damages should be taxed, whether the jury should be in-
structed as to the nontaxability of damages, and whether the damages
should be calculated on a gross earnings theory or net earnings theory
are questions that, left unresolved, will only lead to further confusion
allocated for "pain and suffering" which would still be excludable.
174. See Agar v. Commissioner, 290 F.2d 283 (2d Cir. 1961).
175. Wood v. Commissioner, 34 T.C.M. 817, 820 (1975).
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and taxpayer feelings of unfairness.
Recent developments have raised questions as to the validity of
past interpretations of congressional intent as well as the theories that
the exclusion is based on humanitarian motives or merely for the com-
pensation of the victim. While these theories of excludability seem
valid when applied to personal injury damages for actual expenses, pain
and suffering, and mental anguish, they are unsatisfactory to justify the
exclusion for punitive damages or that segment of any award for lost
earnings. Lost earnings should be equated to actual earnings that are
taxable, and punitive damages are a penalty imposed upon the defend-
ant, making them noncompensatory by definition.
In an era of tax reform that is premised on broadening the tax
base, Congress should re-evaluate the present treatment of personal in-
jury damages. Since there is a recognized need for increasing revenues
and little justification to continue the exclusion in its present form,
Congress should change section 104(a)(2) to limit the exclusion and
federal and state courts should adopt the second prong of the Liepelt
theory.
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